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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT R. WILBURN. * 
Plaintiff, * 
VS. * Case No. 860292-CA 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC. NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
PITTSBURGH. SECOND INJURY FUND 
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
Defendants. 
* 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT SECOND INJURY FUND 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an original proceeding seefcing review by the Utah 
Court of Appeals of an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
which denied plaintiff's application for permanent total disability 
benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act upon the grounds 
that plaintiff had previously compromised and settled his claim for 
those benefits. 
This Court is authorized to conduct a review of the 
lawfulness of the Commission's Order pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 35-1-83. Utah Code Ann. (1953. as amended), 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
As perceived by defendant Second Injury Fund the issues for 
review are as follow: 
1. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
* 
* Category No. 6 
* 
* 
* 
Industrial Commission finding that the Compensation and Settlement 
Agreement entered into by plaintiff was the result of a bona fide 
dispute as to the employer's liability for plaintiff's alleged 
industrial injury. 
2. Whether such a Compensation and Settlement Agreement 
is unenforcible as a matter of law and thus does not bar plaintiff's 
subsequent claim for permanent total disability benefits. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the outset, defendant Second Injury Fund asserts that it 
has read the brief of plaintiff and that of defendant Interstate 
Electric and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh and 
in essence adopts the position expressed by the defendant. However, 
for purposes of this brief the Second Injury Fund will treat only 
the issues set forth above as dispositive of plaintiff's appeal in 
this case. 
Having participated at the Industrial Commission hearing 
and having reviewed the briefs of plaintiff and defendant Interstate 
Electric the Second Injury Fund perceives the statement of this case 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff claims that his industrial injury occurred 
on April 14, 1980 while working for Interstate Electric as a result 
of lifting a small portable generator from the floor to his 
workbench. Plaintiff acknowleged that this activity was a normal, 
routine and common fur^tion which he did on a regular basis while at 
work. (R. 84-85.) 
2. There is a conflict in the record as to whether 
plaintiff's back pain first occurred at the time of or immediately 
after the lifting or first became noticeable after 5 to 10 minutes. 
(R. 350-351.) In any event, plaintiff continued working but 
consulted Dr. Gene Smith the following day concerning the low-back 
pain which he had noticed the day before. 
3. Dr. Smith examined plaintiff then released him to his 
regular work within a few days. The record shows that plaintiff 
took three days off work and some physical ^herapy for two to three 
work weeks, but continued to work thereafter for over a year without 
additional medical treatment. (R. 1, 59-60, 65, 297.) 
4. On February 2, 1981, the carrier for Interstate 
Electric had plaintiff examined by Dr. Wallace Hess for the purpose 
of obtaining a disability rating. Based upon Dr. Hess rating, 
plaintiff was paid for a permanent partial disability of 20% with 
Interstate Electric being responsible for t^ he 5% allocated to the 
alleged industrial injury and the Second Injury Fund paying the 
remaining 15% as a pre-existing impairment. (R. 102.) 
5. Plaintiff did not seek medical treatment again until 
after he had been laid off work on July 31, 1981. (R. 11, 65-66, 
297.) He was placed on temporary total disability after examination 
on August 18, 1981 and continued until September 30, 1983. (R. 
298-300.) 
6. On June 20, 1983, plaintiff wag reexamined by Dr. Hess 
who noted a continued degeneration of plaintiff's arthritic problem 
with his neck and ankles, a condition unrelated to his alleged 
industrial low-back injury. Dr. Hess1 rating at that time was a 
combined total of 36% with 10% assigned t$ the claimed industrial 
injury, 15% assigned to preexisting arthritic in the low back, and 
15% assigned to a non-industrial cervical spine condition. (R. 
181-189.) 
7. In late 1983, plaintiff consulted with Administrative 
Law Judge Jan Moffitt at the Industrial Commission, who advised him 
to make a claim for permanent total disability. Judge Moffitt also 
referred plaintiff to Attorney Robert Shaughnessy, with whom 
plaintiff then consulted. (R. 122-123, 322.) 
8. Following his discussion with Judge Moffitt and 
Attorney Shaughnessy plaintiff contacted Interstate Electric carrier 
and asserted his claim for permanent total disability benefits. At 
this time, it was arranged by the carrier for plaintiff to meet with 
its attorney, Stuart L. Poelman. This meeting occurred on February 
24, 1984 (R. 31). 
9. It is clear from the record that Attorney Poelman 
specifically advised plaintiff that should he claim permanent total 
disability benefits Interstate Electric would raise several defenses 
including the defense that the events of April 14, 1980, as 
described by plaintiff in his statement. did not constitute an 
industrial "accident" under the then-existing legal interpretation 
by the Utah Supreme Court of that concept. It was also explained 
that should Interstate Electric prevail with that defense, plaintiff 
would lose his claim for all additional compensation, including 
future medical expenses. On April 26, 1984, Mr. Poelman again 
advised plaintiff of the effect of the "no accident" defense of the 
defendants, and advised him at that time to seek the advice of other 
counsel. Plaintiff suggested, and Attorney Poelman concurred, that 
plaintiff might confer with either Judge Moffitt or Judge Timothy C. 
Allen at the Industrial Commission. At thi$ time trade offs for a 
settlement were discussed and plaintiff offered to settle for an 
additional 10% permanent partial disability along with continued 
payment of medical expenses. (R. 129-130, 322-323.) Thereafter a 
verbal agreement was reached and a written Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement was prepared by Attorney Poelman and sent to plaintiff on 
May 31, 1984. (R. 35, 115.) 
10. The record is clear that following his receipt of 
written Compromise and Settlement Agreement, plaintiff consulted 
with Attorney Shaun Howell, legal counsel for the Industrial 
Commission, and requested her advice concerning the settlement. (R. 
112, 117-119.) The record shows also that plaintiff previously had 
discussed with Attorney Howell the filing of a claim for permanent 
total disability benefits, once when he brought in his application 
seeking a continuation of total disability benefits and again when 
he delivered some medical records to Ms. HoWell for her review. In 
any event, the record shows that in the jrune, 1984 consultation 
meeting between plaintiff and Attorney Howtell, it was clear that 
plaintiff was asserting a claim for permanent total disability and 
that he knew of the defenses which Attorney Poelman had explained to 
him, including the "no accident" defense which, if successful, would 
bar plaintiff from entitlement to future medical expenses. (R. 
113-114, 141, 145.) Therefore, it seems certain that as of June, 
1984, before entering into the final Written Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement, plaintiff was aware of the defenses including 
the "no accident" defense which would be asserted by Interstate 
Electric in contesting plaintiff's claim for permanent total 
disability. He also was made aware of the consequences should 
defendant prevail in asserting the "no accident11 defense to his 
claim. 
11. Following his conference with Attorney Howell, 
plaintiff proposed to Attorney Poelman that the agreement add 
payment to him of additional $1,590.00 for temporary total 
disability benefits during the fall 1983. The defendants agreed to 
this proposal, revised the agreement and sent it to plaintiff for 
his signature. The record indicates that plaintiff before final 
execution asked Judge Moffitt about the final instrument and then 
signed the agreement. (R. 115, 144.) The written Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement was then sent to the Industrial Commssion on 
November 1, 1984, where it was approved by the Commission through 
its legal counsel, Shaun Howell, on November 28, 1984. (R. 36, 
40.) Defendants then made payment to plaintiff as specified by the 
agreement. (R. 115-116.) 
12. It is noteworthy that by the time plaintiff had 
entered into the written Compromise and Settlement Agreement he was 
63 years old and had not worked for over three years. (R. 119.) In 
addition, he was then on total disability under Social Security and 
was claiming that he could not work. (R. 93. 119.) 
13. It was almost fifteen months later on February 13, 
1986, that plaintiff filed his application with the Industrial 
Commission seeking permanent total disability benefits from the 
defendants. (R. 43.) The defendants answered the application and 
asserted various defenses, including the fact that the claim was 
barred by the Compromise and Settlement Agreement theretofore 
entered into with plaintiff. (R. 44-45.) Hearing on the 
application was held on May 14, 1986, before Administrative Judge 
Richard Sumsion. On July 2, 1986, ^udge Sumsion entered 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 
372-376.) whereby he vacated his prior Interim Order of May 28, 
1986, and ruled that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement entered 
into between the parties and approved by th6 Commission on November 
28, 1984, was a binding settlement agreement which precludes the 
plaintiff from asserting his claim for permanent total disability. 
14. Included in the Findings of The Administrative Law 
Judge which were approved upon review by the full Commission on 
September 9. 1986, with all three Commissioners concurring, (R. 
407.) were the following: 
(a) The defendants were in £ood-faith in asserting 
the defense that the event alleged by the plaintiff did not 
constitute a compensable accident. (R. 339.) 
(b) Plaintiff clearly contemplated asserting a claim 
for permanent total disability benefits prior to the discussion and 
execution by plaintiff of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement. 
(R. 341.) 
(c) It was the clear understanding of the parties, 
including plaintiff, that the trade off contemplated by the 
agreement included a relinquishment of plaintiff's claim for 
permanent total disability. (R. 341.) 
(d) The parties stipulated ifi the written agreement 
itself that there was a bona fide issue as to the compensability of 
the applicant's claim at the time the agreement was executed. (R.38.) 
(e) The agreement had been approved by the 
Industrial Commission's legal counsel. (R. 40.) 
(f) Settlement of industrial claims is usually a 
desirable objective from a policy standpoint. (R. 373.) 
(g) Plaintiff had been advised to and did discuss 
his claim with an attorney prior to signing the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 373.) 
(h) Plaintiff discussed the Settlement Agreement 
with the Commission's Legal Counsel who approved the settlement 
after discussing with plaintiff all of its consequences and 
ramifications. (R.373.) 
(i) Plaintiff gave long and serious consideration to 
the execution of the agreement and returned several times with 
additional requests by way of tradeoff for execution of the 
Agreement as finally signed by all parties. (R. 373.) 
(j) Plaintiff clearly understood the possibility of 
losing future medical benefits were he to lose his claim on the 
issue of "no accident". (R. 373.) 
(k) A Settlement Agreement such as that executed in 
this case is valid under Utah law when an issue concerning the 
compensability of the claim is at issue. (R. 372.) 
(1) To invalidate this Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement would seriously undermine the entire settlement process, 
rendering the many many such agreements uncertain and unpredictable 
thus resulting in increased litigation but imposing an enormous 
administrative burden in the consideration and disposal of worker's 
compensation claims. (R. 374.) 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of defendant Second Injury Fund that 
there is substantial-indeed overwhelming-evidence in the record to 
support the Commission's finding that the Defendants were in good 
faith in asserting the defense that plaintiff's alleged incident of 
April 14, 1980 did not constitute a compensable accident under the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act as then interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, that plaintiff had actual knowledge that defendants 
would use that defense in resisting his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits and that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
executed by plaintiff and defendants recognized specifically that 
there was a bona fide issue as to the compensability of plaintiff's 
alleged industrial injury and that its provisions contemplated and 
constituted a tradeoff of defendant's defenses above mentioned for 
the relinquishment of plaintiff's claim for permanent total 
disability. 
It is also the position of defendant Second Injury Fund 
that settlement of an industrial claim in which there is a bona fide 
issue as to the compensability of such claim is not invalid and 
unenforcable as a matter of law under the Ut^ th Worker's Compensation 
Act as contended by plaintiff. As indicated above, plaintiff was 
fully cognizant of the consequences of his execution of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement and in fact had taken the 
initiative in making repeated demands for additional concessions on 
the part of defendants in order to obtain his complete 
relinquishment of the permanent total disability claim he previously 
had made against defendants and was about to file with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. There is substantial evidence to 
support the finding that plaintiff had been adequately advised of 
the legal effect of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, that he 
had been advised of the consequences should defendants defense of 
"no accident" prevail before the Commission and/or the Court of 
Appeals and that plaintiff deliberately requested additional 
considerations as a tradeoff for his written relinquishment in the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement of his permanent total 
disability rights. Under such circumstances and under well 
established Utah law with respect to reversal on appeal of fact 
findings made by the Commission it is clear beyond reasonable 
controversy in this case that the findings of the Commission that 
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement entered into between 
plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other was a 
valid and enforceable settlement of a bon afide dispute as to the 
compensability of plaintiff's claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. 
With respect to the legal argument of plaintiff that as a 
matter of law the Compromise and Settlement Agreement in this case 
is invalid and unenforceable, it is the position of defendant Second 
Injury Fund that where, as here, the settlement was in resolution of 
a bona fide issue as to the compensability of plaintiff's claim at 
the time the Settlement Agreement was executed, such settlements are 
valid and enforceable as consistent with established Utah law as 
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court nearly a half century ago in 
the Briqham Young University v Industrial Commission case, 279 P. 
889 (1929) in which it was held that a Stipulation and Settlement of 
a disputed claim was appropriate and not in violation of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act if the compensability of the claim was a 
close issue "concerning which reasonable minlas may well differ, and 
where the right of the applicant to receiver is doubtful." In 
support of defendant's position it should b£ pointed out here that 
all pertinent facts including the alleged injury itself and the 
negotiations which led to the execution of the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement and indeed the exertion of the Agreement 
itself all took place prior to the current Supreme Court's 
interpretation of "compensable accident" made in the Robert A. Allen 
case on November 14, 1986. It is generally conceded that the 
established Supreme Court interpretation of "compensable accident" 
prior to the Allen case required that the plaintiff establish an 
"identifiable" accident resulting from some "unusual" exertion or 
physical activity on the part of the employee in order to be 
recognized as a compensable industrial injuty under the provisions 
of Section 35-1-45 U.C.A. Utah Supreme Court decisions referred to 
at that time were those such as Redman Warehousing Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission. 22 Utah 2d 398. 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back 
injury precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not 
compensable without proof of an unusual ev^nt); Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) (back injury from loading 
box of twelve radios into van not compensable); Farmer's Grain 
Co-operative v. Mason. 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to 
claimant with pre-existing condition resulting from delivery of 100 
pound sacks not compensable since the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected); and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Commission. 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up after moving chairs not 
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual). 
Application of the rationale of those cases to the circumstances 
involved in the April. 1980 incident of plaintiff in this case would 
provide strong legal support in the opinion of defendant Second 
Injury Fund for the defense asserted by defendants in this case that 
there was in fact no "compensable accident" within the contemplation 
of the Utah Workmen1s Compensation Statute. Recognition of the 
probable validity of that defense as applied to the circumstances of 
this case would reinforce the validity found by the Commission in 
its evaluation and denial of plaintiff!s claim that the Compromise 
and Settlement Agreement were invalid and unenforceable under the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
In summary, there is overwhelming evidence in the record to 
support the Findings of the Commission necessary for its 
determination that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement executed 
by the parties in November of 1984 was in resolution of a bon afide 
dispute as to the compensability of plaintiff's worker's 
compensation claim and that plaintiff in executing that Settlement 
Agreement intended to and did in fact relinquish any claims he may 
have had for permanent and total disability resulting from his 
alleged industrial injury and finally that the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement as executed and carried out by the parties was 
and is a valid and enforceable agreement which precludes the 
plaintiff from asserting his permanent total disability claim in 
this controversy. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A, POINT I 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS THAT THE COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED 
INTO TO RESOLVE A BONAFIDE DISPUTE OVER DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND TfHAT IT WAS INTENDED TO 
SETTLE ANY CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFF FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION. 
It is now established beyond reasonable controversy that 
the scope of review of factual findings ih Industrial Commission 
cases is limited. In the recent case oi Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Development, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (4/20/87) the Supreme Court 
summarized that review scope as follows: 
The reviewing Court's inguiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary and 
capricious" or "wholly without cause" as contrary 
to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the 
evidence "or without any substantial evidence to 
support them." Only then should the Commission's 
findings be displaced. (Citing Kaiser Steel v. 
Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) and Sabo's 
Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 PH2d 722 (Utah 
1982) 
See also the decision of this Co^rt in Joyce Wilson v. 
Industrial Commission. 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Cft. App. 4/15/87). 
In this controversy the critical Commission's findings were: 
1. There was a bona fide dispute as to defendants1 
liability for plaintiff's alleged industrial injury, and 
2. The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was 
intended to settle plaintiff's claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. 
It is the position of defendant Second Injury Fund that 
there is substantial, indeed overwhelming, evidence in the record to 
support both of those crucial findings. 
As to the first finding that there was a bon afide issue as 
to whether plaintiff's alleged incident of April 14, 1980 
constitutes a "compensable accident" under the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act, Section*i£>l-45, U.C.A., it must be noted that all 
of the events of this controversy, including the execution of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, took place well before the 
uncertainty which surrounded the definition and interpretation of 
"compensable accident" was removed (we hope) by the November 14, 
1986 decision of the Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Prior to that decision, the 
prevailing interpretation of "compensable accident" (certainly the 
position asserted by employers and compensation carriers up to and 
including the Allen case itself) was that there must be an unusual 
identifiable event brought about by unusual exertion or strain and 
not as a result of work activities regularly engaged in or performed 
by the employee in his normal day to day work. Among the many cases 
which prompted employers1 defense of "no accident" was the early 
(1969) Supreme Court decision in Redman Warehousing Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 22 Ut 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (Utah 1969) where 
the Supreme Court, in denying compensation in a case where the 
employee herniated a disc while riding in and driving a long-haul 
truck stated: 
There is nothing in this record that shows any 
unusual event, or "accident", if you please, 
justifying compensability within the nature, 
intent or spirit of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. To conclude otherwise would ensure every 
truck driver, every railroad engineer, every 
airplane pilot, and a lot of others, against a 
physiological malfunction or physical collapse of 
any of hundreds of human organs completely 
unproven as to cause but compensable only by 
virtue of happenstance that the malfunction, 
collapse or injury occurred while the employee 
was on the job, and not home or elsewhere. 454 
P.2d at 285. 
More recent Supreme Court decisions adopting the same 
rationale include Church of Jesus Christ o^ Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (herniated disc from 
standing up after moving chairs in church); Farmers Grain Co-op v. 
Mason, Supra (compensation denied for back injury resulting from 
unloading 100 pound bags of whey from a delitvery truck). The Court 
noted in that case, as here, that the employee had pre-existing back 
ailments and that: 
The evidence further reveals that the type of 
work activity engaged in by defendant (that of 
unloading heavy cargo) was not unusual or 
unexpected. The work was typical of that of a 
truck driver and comparable to the work he had 
followed for a number of years. Further, this 
aggravation of his physical condition gradually 
developed without the intervention of any 
"external occurrence11 or trauma. 606 P.2d at 
239-240. 
See also the 1982 Supreme Court decision it the Sabo case, supra 
which was followed and cited frequently as the determinative 
rationale of "compensable accident" interpretations. In that case 
compensation was denied because of "no accfident" where the back 
injury occurred while the employee was doing his normal, day to day 
work of unloading boxes. The Court again applied its strict 
interpretation of "accident", citing numerous prior decisions, and 
upheld the Commission's factual determination, stating in part: 
The mere fact that defendant1 s impairment 
resulted (in the words of Dr. Momber^fer) 
"entirely from the incident which he alleges to" 
should not imply that a compensable accident has 
occurred, as defined in this opinion. 642 P.2d 
at 726. 
Application of the rationale found in those Supreme Court 
opinions and many others cited by the Court to plaintiff's incident 
of April 14, 1980 shows plainly that defendants1 defense of "no 
compensable accident" in this case was a valid good-faith defense 
and that there was in fact a bona fide dispute as to the 
compensability of plaintiff's alleged injury. The Commission found 
that there was a bona fide dispute and the record evidence supports 
that finding especially when reviewed in the light of the then 
existing Supreme Court rationale as to "compensable accident" 
requirements as found in the cases referred to above. 
The Commission's finding that the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement was intended by the parties to include plaintiff's claim 
for permanent total disability benefits also is amply supported by 
the evidence in the record. The record reveals that plaintiff was 
well aware of his total disability and in fact had applied for and 
was receiving total disability benefits from Social Security (R.119) 
before he even approached defendant for more compensation benefits. 
He had discussed such a claim with Judge Moffitt and was referred by 
her to Attorney Robert Shaughnessy. (R. 122-123) Plaintiff also 
met with defendant's Attorney, Stuart Poelman on several occasions 
and the undisputed testimony is that the discussions centered about 
his claim for permanent total disability (R.lll, 129-130). Indeed 
even at the Hearing, plaintiff admitted such discussions, then when 
asked whether he was claiming total disability in connection with 
the negotiation of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he 
evasively responded: "I don't remember, but t could have." (R.110) 
Finally, the uncontroverted testimony of Shaun Howell, who 
was at that time attorney for the Industrial Commission, reveals 
beyond question that plaintiff understood that the Settlement 
Agreement was directed to his claim for permanent total disability 
and that he knew of the defenses, including the "no compensable 
accident11 defense, which would be asserted by defendant. 
(R.113-114, 141, 145). The evidence is equally positive that 
plaintiff was fully advised by Ms. Howell as to the consequences of 
a successful "no accident" defense by defendants and as to the 
intended effect of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement. (R.145) 
In its entirety the record evidence establishes beyond 
question that plaintiff fully understood the Agreement and gave it 
long and serious consideration right up to the time of final 
execution and that he knew the Settlement v^ as intended to resolve 
fully his claim of permanent total disability. He requested and 
received an added concession by way of more temporary total 
compensation benefits, then executed the final Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement which was approved by the Commission and which 
resulted in additional compensation benefits he received from the 
defendants. Thus, the record contains substantial-indeed 
overwhelming-evidence to support the Commission's Findings that the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement was a settlement of a bona fide 
disputed claim and that it was in settlement also of plaintiff's 
claim for permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
B. POINT II 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE IN COMPROMISE 
AND SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTED CLAIM OF LIABILITY UNDER THE UTAH 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT ARE NOT VOID OR UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, 
Defendants have established-and the Commission has 
found-that there was a bona fide dispute as to compensability of 
plaintiff's alleged industrial injury and that the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement was intended to be a full settlement of 
plaintiff's claim for permanent total disability resulting from that 
incident. It is the position of defendants, including defendant 
Second Injury Fund, that agreements in settlement of disputed 
liability are valid and enforceable under the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
As indicated by the Administrative Law Judge in his 
Supplemental Findings of Fact. Conclusions, of Law and Order (R.372) 
the validity and enforceability of the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement in this case are controlled by the Utah Supreme Court 
holdings in Briqham Young University v. Industrial Commission, 279 
P.889 (Utah 1929) and Barber Asphalt v. Industrial Commission, 103 
Ut. 371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943). In the BYU case, the Supreme Court 
upheld as binding a Settlement Agreement where the compensability of 
the claim was in bona fide dispute, stating that the same statutory 
provision present in this controversy "neither expressly nor by 
necessary implication" restricted the rights of the parties "to 
settle their own controversy and avoid litigation". Id. at 892, 893. 
In the Barber case, relied upon by plaintiff, there was no 
issue as to the compensability of the claims, thus distinguishing 
that case and the decision of the Court in a significant aspect. As 
the Administrative Law Judge pointed out. th^ Barber decision is not 
inconsistent with the BYU case where the Court specifically stated 
that the compensabililty of the claim was a close issue "concerning 
which reasonable minds might well differ and the right of applicant 
to recover was doubtful". (R.372) 
Inherent also in the BYU case as well as the Administrative 
Law Judge's Supplemental Order in this controversy (R.373) is the 
accepted premise that "the settlement of ai|iy disputed claim is a 
desirable objective" because "an adjudication of the claim seldom 
satisfies both parties and frequently leads to appeals and delays 
that thwart the beneficent purposes of workmen's compensation 
legislation". (R.373) 
In this case the Commission has found that there was a bona 
fide dispute as to the compensability (not just the amount) of 
plaintiff's claimed injury. That finding is supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and therefore must be assumed to 
exist. The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was a voluntary, 
uncoerced agreed upon settlement of that disputed liability claim 
with each of the parties making certain concessions and each 
receiving certain benefits in return. Such settlement agreement is 
precisely what was held by the Supreme Court in the BYU case to be a 
valid enforceable means of settling controversies without 
litigation. As such, defendant Second Injury Fund believes that the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement in this controversy is valid and 
enforceable under the Utah Worken's Compensation Act. 
As mentioned above and as pointed out by defendant 
Interstate Electronics brief, the Barber case is not inconsistent. 
either expressly or by implication, with the application of the 
rationale of the BYU case to the facts found by the Commission to 
exist in this controversy. Likewise, also as pointed out in the 
brief of defendant Interstate Electronic, (pp 18, 19) the cases 
outside Utah referred to by plaintiff do not deal with the validity 
of settlements between employers and employees where the dispute is 
a bona fide issue as to the compensability of the claim which is the 
basic legal issue in this case and which was the issue in the BYU 
case. 
In summary, this defendant contends that the rationale of 
the Supreme Court in the BYU case is still good law in Utah and that 
it is directly applicable to the facts found by the Commission in 
this case, where there was in fact a bona fide dispute as to the 
compensability of plaintiff's claim. Therefore, the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement which was found by the Commission to be a 
settlement of that disputed claim is a valid enforceable agreement 
which properly bars plaintiff's later claim for permanent total 
disability arising out of the same alleged industrial injury. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Commission found that there was a bona fide dispute 
between plaintiff and defendants as to whether or not plaintiff 
suffered a compensable accident within the contemplation of the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendants have shown that there is 
substantial evidence to support that finding. The Commission found 
also that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement executed by 
plaintiff and defendants was intended to be and was in fact a 
settlement of plaintiff's claim for permanent total disability. The 
record also contains sufficient substantial Evidence to support that 
finding. Defendants have established th^t the Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement executed in this controversy in resolution of 
the parties1 disputed liability issue wa$ and is a valid and 
enforceable agreement under long-established Utah Workmen's 
Compensation law. Therefore, the appeal of plaintiff in this action 
should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^TC / day of May, 1987 
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